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INTRODUCTION 
 
 On January 11, 2013, Aaron Swartz hung himself.1 Swartz was 26, and 
despite his youth, was already a well-known and accomplished 
programmer. Most notably, Swartz helped develop Creative Commons, and 
his company Infogami merged with Reddit.2 Many prominent computer 
programmers and scholars considered Swartz a genius and a friend, and 
mourned his death.3 Tim Berners-Lee, the inventor of the World Wide 
Web, reacted to Swartz’ death saying “Aaron dead. World wanderers, we 
have lost a wise elder. Hackers for right, we are one down. Parents all, we 
have lost a child. Let us weep."4 
 Almost two years to the day before his death, on January 6, 2011, 
Swartz was arrested in connection with a series of network break-ins of 
MIT’s computer system. The break-ins spanned a few months and Swartz 
carried them out from a storage closet on MIT’s campus.5 Between 
September 2010 and January 2011, Swartz, a Harvard graduate student at 
the time, physically entered MIT campus, and from a storage closet, 
hooked up his computer to MIT’s network. He spoofed his ID on the 
network to remain undetected and downloaded millions of academic 
journals from JSTOR.6   
 On July 11, 2011, a Federal grand jury indicted Swartz for wire fraud, 
computer fraud, unlawfully obtaining information from a protected 
 
* Case Western Reserve University School of Law, JD 2015.  
1. See John Schwartz, Internet Activist, a Creator of RSS, Is Dead at 26, Apparently a 
Suicide, N.Y. TIMES (January 12, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/13/technology/aaron-swartz-internet-activist-
dies-at-26.html. 
2. Id.  Swartz later became a partner in Reddit. 
3. See infra note 13. 
4. Sir Tim Berners-Lee pays tribute to Aaron Swartz, THE TELEGRAPH (Jan. 14, 
2013), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/9800147/Sir-Tim-Berners-
Lee-pays-tribute-to-Aaron-Swartz.html. 
5. Schwartz, Internet Activist, a Creator of RSS, is Dead.  
6. Id; JSTOR is a digital academic library that contains academic journals, books, and 
primary sources.  It is mainly licensed to colleges and universities, but unaffiliated 
individuals may purchase access.  See http://www.jstor.org/. 
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computer, and recklessly damaging a protected computer.7 The charges 
carried a maximum sentence of 35 years in prison. Swartz refused a plea 
deal, and on September 12, 2012 Federal prosecutors added nine more 
felony counts under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”)8, 
increasing the maximum prison time to 50 years.9   
 In all, Swartz was charged with two counts of wire fraud10 and eleven 
violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.11 Usually, wire fraud 
charges involving computers are prosecuted along with the CFAA.12 Thus 
the essence of the prosecution’s case depended on their interpretation and 
application of the CFAA.   
 Reaction to Swartz’ death was very opinionated, dividing legal 
scholars and prompting a public debate about whether Swartz was 
overcharged13 – or whether he even committed a crime to begin with.14 At 
Swartz’ funeral, his father, Robert Swartz, condemned the prosecution, 
saying "[Aaron] was killed by the government, and MIT betrayed all of its 
basic principles."15 Prosecutor Carmen Ortiz declined to comment, but her 
 
7. Schwartz, Internet Activist, a Creator of RSS, is Dead 
8. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2008). 
9. Schwartz, Internet Activist, a Creator of RSS, is Dead 
10. See 18 USC § 1343 (2008). 
11. Id. 
12. See Orin Kerr, The Charges Against Aaron Swartz (Part 1: The Law), THE 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 14, 2013 2:50 AM), 
http://www.volokh.com/2013/01/14/aaron-swartz-charges/. 
13. Compare Lawrence Lessig, Prosecution as a Bully, (Jan. 13, 2013) 
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2013-01-17/the-overzealous-prosecution-
of-aaron-swartz (strongly expressing that the prosecution should not have charged 
Swartz), accord, Jennifer Garnick, With the CFAA, Law and Justice Are Not The 
Same: A Response to Orin Kerr, THE CENTER FOR INTERNET LAW AND SOCIETY 
(Jan. 14, 2013 11:55 PM), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2013/01/cfaa-law-
and-justice-are-not-same-response-orin-kerr, Stephen L. Carter, The Overzealous 
Prosecution of Aaron Swartz, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Jan. 17, 2013 6:30 PM ), 
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2013-01-17/the-overzealous-prosecution-
of-aaron-swartz,  James Boyce, The Prosecution of Aaron Swartz: A Reply to Orin 
Kerr, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 18, 2013 10:00 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-boyle/prosecution-aaron-
swartz_b_2508242.html, with Kerr, The Charges Against Aaron Swartz supra note 
12 at 2.  
14. See Lessig, Prosecution as a Bully; See also David Boeri, Retired Federal Judge 
Joins Criticism Over Handling Of Swartz Case, WBUR, 
http://www.wbur.org/2013/01/16/gertner-criticizes-ortiz-swartz (interviewing 
retired federal judge who stated: “Just because you can charge someone with a 
crime, just because a technical crime has been committed, doesn’t mean you 
should”). 
15. Sandra Guy, Aaron Swarz was ‘killed by government,’ father says at funeral, 
CHICAGO SUN-TIMES (Jan. 15, 2013), 
http://www.suntimes.com/business/17594002-420/aaron-swartz-memorialized-at-
service.html (last accessed December 21, 2013). 
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husband replied through Twitter, writing: "Truly incredible that in their 
own son's obit[uary] they blame others for his death and make no mention 
of the 6 month offer."16   
 Perhaps Robert Swartz’ words were an emotional reaction by a 
mourning father, but many legal scholars’ reaction targeted the CFAA’s 
harsh criminal treatment of Swartz in light of an intrusion that was neither 
malicious nor prolonged.17 Jennifer Garnick, director of Civil Liberties for 
the Center of Internet and Society at Stanford Law School wrote: “The 
CFAA is incredibly broad and covers swaths of online conduct that should 
not merit prison time.” A former criminal defense attorney and friend of 
Swartz’, Garnick concluded: “Exactly because the CFAA arguably applies 
to Aaron’s alleged actions, it should be amended.”18   
 Others differed.  Professor Orin Kerr19 believed the charges were based 
on an appropriate reading of the law.20 But Kerr recognized that the CFAA, 
in its current form, lead to undesired outcomes: “The problem raised by the 
Swartz case is ... [that] felony liability under the statute is triggered much 
too easily. The law needs to draw a distinction between low-level crimes 
and more serious crimes, and current law does so poorly..."21 The back and 
forth correspondence, publicized through blogs and online editorials22 
differed in sympathy expressed towards Swartz, but agreed in principal that 
the CFAA no longer worked well as a viable, well-balanced, computer 
crime statute. 
 Originally, the CFAA created three federal crimes limited to federal 
 
16. Karen McVeigh, Aaron Swartz: husband of prosecutor criticizes internet activist’s 
family, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 15, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/jan/15/aaron-swartz-husband-
prosecutor-criticises. 
17. See Lessing, Garnick, Carter, Boyce supra note 13. 
18. Jennifer Garnick, Towards Learning from Losing Aaron Swartz: Part 2, THE 
CENTER FOR INTERNET AND SOCIETY (Jan. 15, 2013 3:54 PM), 
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2013/01/towards-learning-losing-aaron-swartz-
part-2. 
19. Orin S. Kerr is a nationally recognized computer crime law scholar, and current 
George Washington Law School professor, See 
http://www.law.gwu.edu/Faculty/profile.aspx?id=3568 (last accessed December 
19, 2013). 
20. Orin Kerr, The Charges Against Aaron Swartz (Part 1: The Law), THE VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Jan. 14, 2013 2:50 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/01/14/aaron-
swartz-charges/ (“I think the charges against Swartz were based on a fair reading 
of the law. None of the charges involved aggressive readings of the law or any 
apparent prosecutorial overreach. All of the charges were based on established case 
law”). 
21. Orin Kerr, Aarons Law, Drafting the Best Limits of the CFAA, And a reader Poll 
on A Few Examples, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 27, 2013 11:46 PM) 
http://www.volokh.com/2013/01/27/aarons-law-drafting-the-best-limits-of-the-
cfaa-and-a-reader-poll-on-a-few-examples-part-i/. 
22. See supra note 13 at 2. 
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interest computers. Those crimes were: accessing national security 
information, private financial information, or a computer owned by the US 
Government without authorization.23 A federal interest computer was any 
computer on which national security or private financial information was 
found.24 
 The CFAA’s scope has been expanded through revisions. Today, the 
CFAA is over-inclusive of criminal activity, creating over-criminalization 
that is only checked by prosecutorial discretion. There are two reasons for 
this.  First, Congress never defined “authorization.” This creates vagueness 
and has resulted in a Circuit split between the Seventh and Ninth Circuit.  
Second, the CFAA is a bright line rule with no exceptions.25 
 This Note shall explain both problems and offer a possible solution to 
each. Section I discusses the history of computer crime law. Section II 
presents the circuit split and offers a solution. Section III discusses 
consequences of the CFAA’s bright line approach. Section IV proposes an 
amendment to the CFAA that creates an exception for types of uses that, 
although unauthorized, should not merit criminal prosecution. Swartz’ case 
is revisited, and the discussion from the previous sections is applied.  
 
I.  HISTORY OF COMPUTER CRIME LAW 
 
A.  Pre-CFAA 
 
 Computer misuse prosecution can be traced back to 1972.26  
Defendants were charged with computer crimes under existing laws such as 
trespass, burglary, and theft, because no specific computer crime statute 
existed.27 Conceptually, the cyber world and physical world were different, 
and courts struggled to find a satisfactory approach to prosecuting 
computer crime. 
 Prosecution under a theft statute might have required a property 
interest in the computer and a showing that the defendant’s misuse of the 
computer deprived the owner of their property interest.28 In United States v. 
 
23. Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 
MINN. L. REV 1561, 1564 (2010) (discussing Congressional intent for enacting a 
computer crime statute in 1984). 
24. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges at 1564 (defining federal interest). 
25. See Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” 
in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1596, 1601 (2003) (questioning 
why the “same one-size-fits-all prohibitions on unauthorized access” still govern in 
light of rapid technological advancement since 1984 that has made a bright line 
rule obsolete in the face of modern society). 
26. See Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” 
in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1596, 1605 (2003). 
27. See Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope, at 1605. 
28. Id. at 1609. 
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Seidlitz,29 a former employee of a military contractor used a stolen 
password, logged onto the company’s network, downloaded, and made a 
copy of software. Identifying a property interest was easy: the company 
owned the software and it was protected by password. Showing how, by 
making a copy of the software, defendant depraved the company of the 
software was difficult. The original copy remained in the company’s 
possession, but it was clear the defendant’s action impacted the company’s 
financial interests.30 
 Because of such trivialities, courts took a case-by-case, results-oriented 
approach. If computer misuse caused harm, then property was taken and 
defendants were liable.31 If misuse did not cause appreciable harm, then 
property was not taken and defendants had not committed a crime.32 In 
Seidlitz, the defendant intended to use the software for his own business.33 
This would have caused the company that owned the software financial 
harm by depriving it of a competitive advantage, and the Fourth Circuit 
found him guilty of wire fraud.34 
 The pre-CFAA approach premised liability on an actual showing of 
harm, evaluated case-by-case. If computer misuse passed a certain 
threshold of harm, it was considered theft, and, prosecuted.35 If the 
Government did not demonstrate that defendant’s conduct met the burden 
of harm, the case was dismissed.36 
 
B.  1984: First Computer Crime Legislation 
 
 The CFAA was codified as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control 
Act of 1984 and named the “Crime Fraud and Abuse Act” in 1986.37 In the 
last 30 years, the CFAA has been amended five times. With each 
amendment, the scope of the CFAA has been enlarged. In 1984, the CFAA 
was a narrow and specific piece of legislation, limited to unauthorized 
 
29. See United States v. Seidlitz, 589 F.2d 152 (4th Cir. 1978) (ruling that jury could 
find defendant had fraudulent intent to use the information from plaintiff’s 
computer system). 
30. See Seidlitz, 589 F.2d at 160. 
31. See Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope at 1611 (“Faced with such riddles, courts tended to 
reach results-oriented outcomes”). 
32. See Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope, 1611. 
33. See Seidlitz, 589 F.2d at 154 (“In June, 1975, Seidlitz resigned this job and 
returned to work at his own computer firm in Alexandria, Virginia”). 
34. Id. at 160. 
35. See Seidlitz supra at note 30. 
36. Compare Seidlitz with United States v. Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069 (1st Cir. 1997) 
(“Curiosity on the part of an IRS officer may lead to dismissal, but curiosity alone 
will not sustain a finding of participation in a felonious crime scheme to deprive 
the IRS of its property”). 
37. See Kerr, Vagueness Challenges at 1564-1565 (discussing history of CFAA). 
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access of a “federal interest” computer, defined as a computer that held 
national security or financial information, or was property of the 
Government.38   
 The first offense, codified at § 1030(a)(1), prohibited unauthorized 
access to a computer for the purpose of obtaining national security 
information with intent, or reason to believe, the information would be 
used against the USA’s interests.39 The second offense, codified at 
§1030(a)(2), prohibited unauthorized access to a computer to obtain 
financial information from an institution or consumer reporting agency.40 
The third offense, codified at §1030(a)(3) prohibited a person from 
unauthorized access to a Government computer if doing so affected the 
computer’s operation.41 The purpose of all three statutes was to protect 
three specific Government interests.42 
 The next two amendments, in 1986 and 1994, brought additional 
liabilities and a civil remedy, but the scope of the CFAA remained limited 
to “federal interest computers”.43 
 
C.  1996: Significant Expansion 
 
 Congress expanded the CFAA in three significant ways in 1996. 
Congress’ intent was “addressing in a single statute the problem of 
computer crime”.44 First, a new felony enhancement section for crime and 
extortion was added. The two other changes created more significant legal 
consequences. The scope of “unauthorized access” in 1030(a)(2) was 
expanded beyond only financial information. And, the limitation to 
“federal interest computer” was expanded to “protected computer.”45 
 The scope of 1030(a)(2), prohibiting unauthorized access to financial 
information, was expanded to include unauthorized access to obtain any 
information of any kind if the conduct involved an interstate or foreign 
 
38. See Kerr, Vagueness Challenges at 1564. 
39. See 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(1)-(a)(3) (1984). 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. See Kerr, Vagueness Challenges at 1564 (“All three statutes were tailored to a 
specific government interest: national security, financial records, and government 
property”). 
43. Id. at 1564-1566; See also 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(4)-(6); See also 1030(g) (1994) 
(allowing private cause of action to recover damages resulting from unauthorized 
use). 
44. S.REP. NO. 104-357, at 5 (1996) (“As intended when the law was originally 
enacted, the Computer Fraud and Abuse statute facilitates addressing in a single 
statute the problem of computer crime, rather than identifying and amending every 
potentially applicable statute affected by advances in computer technology”). 
45. See Kerr, Vagueness Challenges at 1566-1567. 
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communication.46 Finally, and most significantly, Congress expanded the 
CFAA’s limitation to “federal interest computers” was expanded to 
“protected computers.”47 A “protected computer” was defined to include 
any computer “used in interstate or foreign commerce or 
communication.”48 This gave the Government jurisdiction over virtually 
any business’s computer that was connected to the Internet.49   
 
D. Post 9-11 
 
 In response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Congress 
expanded the meaning of “protected computer” to include computers 
outside the United States “used in a matter that affects interstate or foreign 
commerce or communication of the United States.”50 
 
E.  2008: Revisiting 1996 
 
 The requirement of an “interstate or foreign communication” as means 
was removed from 1030(a)(2), so that, under 1030(a)(2)(C), any 
unauthorized access to any protected computer that results in retrieval of 
any information of any kind is covered by the CFAA.51   
 But, more importantly, the definition of “protected computer” was 
again expanded. The word “or affecting” was added, and currently the 
phrase now reads, “used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or 
communication.”52 “Affecting interstate commerce” is a term of art, 
showing Congressional intent as far as legally permissible under the 
Commerce Clause. In application, the Commerce Clause gives the 
Government power to “regulate purely local activities that are part of an 
economic class of activities that have a substantial effect on interstate 
 
46. Id. 
47. Id.  
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 1568. 
51. Id. at 1569. 
52. Id.;  See also18 U.S.C. 1030(e)(2)(B) (2008); See also 18 U.S.C. 1030(e)(2) 
(defining protected computer to include any computer: 
“(A) exclusively for the use of a financial institution or the United States 
Government, or, in the case of a computer not exclusively for such use, used by or 
for a financial institution or the United States Government and the conduct 
constituting the offense affects that use by or for the financial institution or the 
Government; or 
(B) which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication, 
including a computer located outside the United States that is used in a manner that 
affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United States”). 
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commerce.”53 In effect, the CFAA has, almost blanket jurisdiction to 
criminalize any form of unauthorized access.54 
 Throughout every revision, Congress expanded the scope of 
unauthorized use, but Congress never defined authorization. Furthermore, 
no exceptions were added, despite constant expansion of criminalization, 
which engulfed previously innocuous actions. The result in the present day 
is, that the CFAA is a blanket rule.  Once triggered, its only constraint is 
prosecutorial discretion. The remainder of this Note discusses issues arising 
from this. 
 
II. CIRCUIT SPLIT 
 
A.  Defining Authorization 
 
 The Seventh Circuit interprets authorization more expansively than the 
Ninth Circuit. The split emerged from employer-employee disputes about 
when an employee acts without authorization or exceeds authorization. The 
Seventh Circuit ruled that an employee’s authorization is terminated when 
the employee’s actions violate a duty of loyalty owned to the employer.55 
The Ninth Circuit has declined to interpret authorization so broadly.56 
Because Congress has not defined authorization, the Ninth circuit 
interpreted the word according to its common meaning. It ruled that an 
employee’s authorization only ends if the employer revokes it, even if the 
employee uses his authorization in a way that is harmful to the employer or 
in violation of a state law. 
 
B.  The Seventh Circuit 
 
 In International Airport Centers, LLC v. Citrin57 the Seventh Circuit 
ruled that an employee’s use of his employer’s computer terminated his 
authorized access because he used it in a way that violated a duty of loyalty 
he owed the employer. Defendant Citrin was an employee of International 
Airport Centers (“IAC”). He was given a laptop by IAC to perform his job 
and was authorized to “return or destroy” data on the laptop before 
returning it.58 Citrin quit and started a competing business. Before returning 
the computer, Citrin deleted all data and uploaded a secure-erasure 
 
53. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005) (ruling that Congress is allowed to 
regulate marijuana grown for home use because the aggregate effect is to reduce 
demand for marijuana in the national marijuana market). 
54. See Kerr, Vagueness Challenges at 1571 (concluding that after 2008, the CFAA 
basically covers everything with a microchip). 
55. See International Airport Centers, LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006). 
56. See LVRC Holdings L.L.C. v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009). 
57. Citrin, 440 F.3d at 419. 
58. Id. 
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program to prevent discovery and recovery of the files he deleted.59 
 IAC sued Citrin under the CFAA for, among other reasons, 
intentionally accessing a protected computer without authorization or 
exceeding authorization.60 Citrin argued that he was authorized to delete 
files by IAC before returning the computer, and, therefore he did not 
exceed authorization when he deleted the files and uploaded the secure-
erasure program.61 The District Court agreed and dismissed the case, but 
the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The Seventh Circuit reasoned 
that it was unlikely IAC intended Citrin to destroy files that IAC did not 
have duplicates of, or which would show Citrin’s misconduct.62 Citrin used 
his authority to deprive IAC of something they wanted. This constituted a 
breach of a duty of loyalty he owed IAC. Violating that duty triggered 
termination of his authorized use of the computer.63   
 
C. The Ninth Circuit 
 
 The Seventh Circuit’s ruling in Citrin implies that the manner in which 
an employee uses his access can terminate his authorization.  IAC did not 
explicitly tell Citrin his access was terminated. Citrin’s use of the computer 
terminated his authority because he covered up his misconduct. 
 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit declined to follow Citrin when it decided 
LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka.64 The Court implied that the CFAA is 
primarily an access statute, not a use statute. It ruled that access could only 
be terminated by the employer’s manifestations towards the employee, not 
by the employee’s use, even if the employee violated a duty of loyalty 
owed to the employer or a state law.65 
 LVRC Holdings (“LVRC”) operated a substance abuse rehabilitation 
center.  It hired Brekka to oversee Internet marketing programs.66 Brekka 
had a personal business that provided consulting to rehabilitation centers.  
In September 2003, using LVRC’s computer, Brekka emailed himself and 
his wife LVRC usage statistics. The emailed documents included budget 
information, patient admission reports, and names of past and current 
patients. This is the type of information Brekka’s personal consulting 
business provided to rehabilitation centers that competed with LVRC’s 
center. In October 2003, Brekka left LVRC. A year later when LVRC 
 
59. Id. 
60. Id; See also 1030(a)(5)(A) (2008) (“intentionally causes damage without 
authorization, to a protected computer”). 
61. See Citrin, 440 F.3d at 419. 
62. Id. at 421. 
63. Id. 
64. See Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1134. 
65. Id. at 1135. 
66. Id. at 1129. 
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uncovered Brekka’s emails from September, they sued him under the 
CFAA.67 
 LVRC alleged that, under Citrin, Brekka intentionally accessed its 
computer without authorization, or, in excess of authorized access.68 The 
District Court concluded Brekka had authorization because he was 
employed by LVRC in September 2003 and LVRC did not present any 
confidentiality agreement requiring Brekka to keep emailed documents 
confidential.69 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed. 
 In rejecting Citrin, the Ninth Circuit interpreted authorization by the 
word’s plain meaning because the CFAA does not define it. The plain 
meaning of authorization is “permission or power granted by an 
authority.”70 The Court concluded this meant authorization depended on 
the employer’s action.  Citrin’s interpretation did not comport to the plain 
language because the Seventh Circuit interpreted authorization by the 
manner in which the employee used his employer’s computer. In contrast, 
the Ninth Circuit said an employee remains authorized to use a computer 
even if the employee uses his authorization in a way that harms the 
employer or breaks a state law because authorization is determined by the 
employer’s assent of authorization to the employee.71   
 Brekka was authorized to use LVRC’s computer. He likely violated a 
duty of loyalty to LVRC because he could, and likely did, give LVRC’s 
information about potential and past patients to rival rehabilitation center 
facilities. But the Ninth Circuit did not consider how Brekka used the 
information as a factor. Therefore Brekka’s violation of his duty to LVRC 
was inconsequential to whether or not he exceeded authorization. 
 
D. Nosal: Brekka Applied 
 
 In United States v. Nosal,72 the Ninth Circuit applied Brekka to a 
criminal case. The Court dismissed five counts of CFAA violations against 
a former employee and his accomplices (together, the “defendants”) 
because the Government failed to show that defendants’ accessing 
confidential information on their employer’s network was without 
authorization or in excess of authorized access.73 Nosal was a former 
 
67. Id. at 1130. 
68. Id.; See also 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(2) (2008) (“ … intentionally accesses a computer 
without authorization or exceeds authorized access …”); See also 1030(a)(4) 
(2008) (“ … knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer 
without authorization, or exceeds authorized access … “). 
69. See Brekka 581 F.3d at 1132. 
70. Id. at 1133. 
71. Id. 
72. See United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissing five counts of 
unauthorized use under CFAA). 
73. Id. at 856. 
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executive at Korn/Ferry International (“Korn/Ferry”), an executive search 
firm. He left Korn/Ferry to start a competing firm and asked three former 
colleagues, who were still employed at Korn/Ferry, to access Korn/Ferry’s 
computer system and give him confidential information consisting of 
source lists, names, and client information.74 
 Nosal was argued before Brekka was decided. The Government argued 
that Korn/Ferry’s computer use policy gave employees certain rights that, 
when violated, resulted in exceeding authorized access. Presumably, 
accessing confidential information with the intent to use it against 
Korn/Ferry terminated their authorized use.75 Nosal argued that “exceeds 
authorized access” refers to someone who is authorized to view only 
certain information but views additional information he is unauthorized to 
view.76 Initially, District Court rejected Nosal’s argument, but reversed and 
dismissed after Brekka was decided.77 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit 
originally reversed the District Court, but granted an interlocutory appeal. 
On review de novo, the Ninth Circuit re-instated the District Court’s 
original judgment and dismissed all CFAA charges against Nosal.78 
 The Ninth Circuit declined the Government’s broader interpretation. 
Specifically, the Court noted that Congress enacted the CFAA in 1984 to 
deal with computer hacking, not with misappropriation of information or 
with the breach of confidentiality agreements by employees.79 The 
Government’s construction would have expanded the CFAA’s scope 
beyond computer hacking and criminalized many innocuous computer uses 
that people would have no reason to believe constitute a federal crime.80 
Furthermore, employers could manipulate computer-use and personnel 
policies traditionally governed by tort and contract law into policies 
governed by criminal law. Since policies vary from company to company, 
criminal liability could be premised on subjective standards.81 
 Here, like in Brekka, defendants had authorization to access the 
information. The Court noted that the Government could prosecute Nosal 
 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 857. 
76. See Nosal 676 F.3d at 856. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 858 (“While the CFAA is susceptible to the government's broad 
interpretation, we find Nosal's narrower one more plausible. Congress enacted the 
CFAA in 1984 primarily to address the growing problem of computer hacking”). 
80. Id. at 859 (“The government's construction of the statute would expand its scope 
far beyond computer hacking to criminalize any unauthorized use of information 
obtained from a computer. This would make criminals of large groups of people 
who would have little reason to suspect they are committing a federal crime”). 
81. Id. (generally discussing hypotheticals in which an employee may violate a 
company  policy, such as internet use, and be criminally liable for an innocuous act 
such as visiting ESPN.com). 
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and his accomplices on other charges, but not under the CFAA because 
using the confidential information against Korn/Ferry’s interests did not 
establish lack of authorization. 
 
E. Solution to the Split 
 
 The CFAA is not an effective statute because it can be interpreted in 
two equally plausible ways. The Supreme Court should adopt Brekka 
because it is the more narrow reading of the law and the vagueness 
doctrine82 requires courts to reject the broader view of authorization in 
Citrin.83   
 Adopting Brekka would eliminate vagueness as to what authorization 
means.  The vagueness doctrine requires the legislature to establish general 
guidelines.84 Establishing the literal definition of “authorization” would 
create a clear guideline for law enforcement. Citrin fails to do this because 
it would criminalize millions of innocuous acts by turning everyday 
computer use into a potential crime.85 On the other hand, Brekka would 
exclude routine employee computer use from criminal liability.86 
 Furthermore, interpreting authorization by its literal meaning is most 
fair to defendants.87 Brekka would put responsibility on employers to 
clearly define rules and enforce them through tort and contract law in civil 
court.88 Under Citrin, employers would have an unfair advantage in 
disputes with employees, because along with a civil remedy, they would 
have the force of criminal enforcement for subjective circumstances 
 
82. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (establishing that vagueness 
doctrine does not require actual notice, only that “legislature establish general 
guidelines to govern law enforcement”). 
83. Kerr, Cybercrime Vagueness at 23-24 (arguing that courts should adapt Nosal). 
84. See Lawson, 461 U.S. at 361 (ruling that a California statute requiring loiterers to 
carry “credible and reliable” identification violated the due process clause because 
it did not clarify what satisfies “credible and reliable identification” thereby 
facilitating arbitrary law enforcement). 
85. See Kerr, Cybercrime Vagueness at 25 (concluding that routine employee use for 
personal reasons would renter a criminal anyone who even for one second uses 
their computer in a way not benefitting the employer). 
86. Id. (reasoning that it is unrealistic to have a rule criminalizing all use against the 
employer’s interest because virtually every person uses their employer’s computer 
for personal use, and an instantaneous unauthorized use should not trigger criminal 
liability). 
87. See Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1134 (“The Supreme Court has long warned against 
interpreting criminal statutes in surprising and novel ways that impose unexpected 
burdens on defendants”). 
88. See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 859 (“(“Employer-employee and company-consumer 
relationships are traditionally governed by tort and contract law; the government's 
proposed interpretation of the CFAA allows private parties to manipulate their 
computer-use and personnel policies so as to turn these relationships into ones 
policed by the criminal law”). 
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traditionally governed by tort and contract law.89 
 A narrower interpretation of authority would reduce overcharge. Nosal 
was charged with over twenty counts, and five were dismissed because 
they were CFAA charges.90 In situations such as Nosal, the prosecution 
could stack the case against a defendant by overcharging him.91 This would 
lead to the defendant facing a higher prison term under the federal 
sentencing guidelines. The prosecution could then offer a plea deal and 
pressure defendant into taking it.92 
 Finally, Brekka’s reading is closer to Congressional intent. In 1984, 
Congress intended to address computer hacking, not employer-employee 
disputes.93 If Congress intended conduct like Nosal’s to be criminally liable 
under the CFAA, it should act. 
 
III. A BRIGHT LINE AND A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE 
 
A. The Need for Congressional Reform 
 
 The CFAA is over-inclusive for two reasons. First, as stated in the 
preceding section, it criminalizes innocuous crimes. Second, it does not 
have exceptions permitting certain classes of persons or excluding certain 
types of infractions. Currently, the only filter on the CFAA is prosecutorial 
discretion. This is not assuring, because it’s not clear the Government, or at 
least every individual prosecutor, can be trusted to make a responsible, 
sense-making, and unbiased decision in every case.94 
 The Supreme Court can solve the first problem by solving the Circuit 
Split in favor of Brekka. The Court cannot solve the second. That requires 
Congressional action to amend the CFAA. 
 
B. Lack of Exceptions 
 
89. Id.  
90. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges at 1587 (using Nosal as an example of prosecutorial 
overreach because the CFAA’s vagueness allows prosecution “based on aggressive 
readings of the statute”. 
91. Id. 
92. This is discussed in Section II, and suggests that Swartz was overcharged and 
pressured to accept a plea. 
93. See Nosal 676 F.3d at 858 (“The government agrees that the CFAA was concerned 
with hacking, which is why it also prohibits accessing a computer “without 
authorization.” According to the government, that prohibition applies to hackers, 
so the “exceeds authorized access” prohibition must apply to people who are 
authorized to use the computer, but do so for an unauthorized purpose”). 
94. Judge Kozinski, Chief Judge of the Ninth District expressed this in Nosal at 
562(“The government assures us that, whatever the scope of the CFAA, it won't 
prosecute minor violations. But we shouldn't have to live at the mercy of our local 
prosecutor. … And it's not clear we can trust the government when a tempting 
target comes along”). 
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 The CFAA can be reduced to a bright-line rule drawn around a box: if 
a person has no authorization to open the box, or exceeds authorization, 
then access to information inside the box is outlawed.95 But authorization is 
subject to interpretation, especially in a networked environment.96 For this 
reason, unless the unauthorized access is done with malice or involve 
matters of national security,97 disputes regarding “authorization” under the 
CFAA are best left to be disputed in civil court between the parties 
involved. Those parties are best able to address the malleable aspects of 
authorization.   
 Authorization is malleable because it is not expressed the same 
universally. Terms of service, pop-ups, cultural expectations, and 
employment contracts are all different ways authorization may be 
conveyed, or revoked.98 Outside of the computer context, disregarding any 
of them might not be a crime, or even a civil offense.99 But, in drawing a 
bright line rule around the box the CFAA protects the box’s contents 
regardless of social values or other existing laws about the information in 
the box.   
 Such a rigid law is generally against social convention. Other laws 
regarding right to information balance protection of information with social 
goods.100 For example, copyright law protects the copyright holder but 
makes an exception for fair use.101 Trade secrets protect against 
misappropriation and must be specifically defined.  Classified information 
is marked, but cultural and legal history permits journalists and news 
outlets to report on its issues without prosecution.102 
 
95. Jennifer Garnick, Towards Learning from Losing Aaron Swartz: Part 2, THE 
CENTER FOR INTERNET AND SOCIETY (Jan. 15, 2013 3:54 PM), 
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2013/01/towards-learning-losing-aaron-swartz-
part-2 (interpreting the CFAA as a bright-line rule around a box with no regard for 
what’s in the box, even if it includes otherwise public data); See also supra note 25 
at 4. 
96. Id. 
97. See 18 U.S.C. 1030(d)(2) (2008) (“The Federal Bureau of Investigation shall have 
primary authority to investigate offenses under subsection (a)(1) for any cases 
involving espionage, foreign counterintelligence, information protected against 
unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national defense or foreign relations, or 
Restricted Data … “). 
98. Garnick, Losing Aaron Swartz: Part 2 (writing from her experience as a former 
criminal defense lawyer). 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. Id; See also New York Times Co. vs. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (ruling 
that the New York Times could publish the Pentagon Papers, which were still 
classified at the time, without risk of censorship and punishment.  This overruled 
President Richard Nixon’s claimed executive authority to prevent the New York 
Times from publishing classified information in its possession). 
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 The Supreme Court ruling in favor of Brekka will not address the 
CFAA’s rigidity. Under Brekka, if a person does not have authorization, or 
mistakenly goes beyond their authorization on a network, they may have 
committed a federal crime, despite having done an innocuous thing.103 
Brekka would eliminate vagueness and concretely define authorization, but 
it would not create an exception for situations when use is unauthorized but 
does not rise to the level of criminality. For these reasons, Congress must 
step in and create an exception.   
 
C. Prosecutorial Discretion 
 
 CFAA criminal prosecution inherently lends itself to abuse of 
prosecutorial discretion.104 The problem is two-fold – part human and part 
systematic. Prosecutors decide in each case whether to charge a person, and 
if so, with what charges.105 The other problem is systematic: federal 
sentencing is determined by federal sentencing guidelines.106  In practice, 
the guidelines set “draconian sentences”107 that almost always increase 
upwards and never down.   
 CFAA sentencing is determined according to a calculation of loss 
incurred. Sentences are more harsh and unpredictable than in other federal 
cases because the CFAA’s definition of loss is very broad and not limited 
to foreseeable damages.108 Furthermore, the prosecution’s burden of proof 
 
103. See Stephen L. Carter, The Overzealous Prosecution of Aaron Swartz, BLOOMBERG 
VIEW (Jan. 17, 2013 6:30 PM ), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2013-01-
17/the-overzealous-prosecution-of-aaron-swartz (giving an example of how, if a 
workplace policy does not allow internet access for any personal use, and an 
employee accesses their bank account at work to pay a bill, they’ve committed a 
felony under the CFAA because they’ve exceeded their authorized use); See 
generally Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope at 1650-1651 (Discussing how in contrast to 
current law, his proposal would limit scope of unauthorized access, and laws 
“would no longer threaten to transform disagreements with computer owners into 
criminal violations”). 
104. See Garnick, Losing Aaron Swartz: Part 2 (“Voluminous, overlapping charges 
may be typical …) See generally Kerr, The Criminal Charges Against Aaron 
Swartz (Part 2: Prosecutorial Discretion), THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 16, 
2013 11:34 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/01/16/the-criminal-charges-
against-aaron-swartz-part-2-prosecutorial-discretion/ (discussing that in general, 
the charges against Swartz were not outside the usual conduct of prosecutors, who 
overcharge defendants to induce plea deals). 
105 See Kerr, Criminal Charges Against Swartz, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 14, 
2013 2:50 AM) http://www.volokh.com/2013/01/14/aaron-swartz-charges/ (“The 
DOJ has the discretion to charge cases or not, and prosecutors can agree to 
different plea deals or even agree to have charges dismissed”). 
106. See Garnick, Losing Aaron Swartz: Part 2 (discussing federal sentencing based on 
her experiences as a criminal defense attorney and according to federal sentencing 
guidelines). 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
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is very low.109 The effect is that, many defendants are cornered into 
accepting a plea deal as their only rational legal option, rather than opt for a 
trial and risk significant prison time and more expenses. 
 
D. Overcharge 
 
 In many typical federal cases, the Government overcharges the 
defendant.110 The prosecution then offers the defendant a deal:  plead guilty 
to a felony and waive the right to appeal in return for the prosecution’s 
suggesting a significantly reduced sentence.111 If the defendant refuses the 
offer, the prosecutor typically returns to the grand jury and adds more 
charges. Many times, charges overlap and add more potential prison 
time.112     
 Overcharging gives the prosecution an unfair advantage. The defendant 
must defend against every charge, but the Government often needs to prove 
only one charge to obtain the maximum sentence.113 Furthermore, 
overcharging is likely to predispose the jury to find the defendant guilty 
because jurors are more likely to infer the defendant’s guilt from the sheer 
volume of charges against him.114 A case tried under the CFAA often 
requires lay jurors to understand technology, physics, and economic 
concepts that are outside of common knowledge.115 The jury’s 
predisposition towards the prosecution, and likely layman knowledge of 
disciplines a jury must grasp well if the defendant is to be successful, 
reduces the defendant’s chance of acquittal even more.116   
 
E. Federal Sentencing 
   
 A high flexibility in calculating loss and a low standard of proof give 
the prosecution unfettered discretion to successfully argue for higher or 
lower sentences. Federal sentences are usually determined by federal 
 
109. Id. 
110. Id (“Voluminous overlapping charges may be typical, but they can give unfair 
advantage to the prosecution”); See also Orin Kerr, The Criminal Charges Against 
Aaron Swartz (Part 2: Prosecutorial Discretion), THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 
16, 2013 11:34 PM) http://www.volokh.com/2013/01/16/the-criminal-charges-
against-aaron-swartz-part-2-prosecutorial-discretion/ (writing that overcharge is a 
frequent tactic used by prosecutors to scare defendants into pleading guilty). 
111. See Garnick, Losing Aaron Swartz: Part 2 (drawing conclusions based on her 
experiences defending criminal defendants under information statues, including the 
CFAA). 
112. Id.  
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
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sentencing guidelines in proportion to defendant’s past record and the 
offense characteristics.117 CFAA sentencing is harsher and less predictable 
than sentencing under other federal statutes because CFAA sentencing is 
determined by loss. Loss is defined as reasonable loss to any victim, and is 
not capped to foreseeable damages.118 This is in contrast to similar non-
CFAA fraud crimes, to which guidelines include only reasonable 
foreseeable monetary harm.119 The prosecution in a CFAA case can 
calculate loss as narrowly or as broadly as it wants. 
 The standard of proof to show loss is low. Federal sentencing is 
generally done by preponderance of evidence.120 A judge need only make a 
“reasonable estimate of loss.” Since the prosecution may find a wide range 
of reasonable loss in any given case, sentencing unpredictable.121 
 
F. Overall Effect 
 
 The practical effect of overcharge and sentencing guidelines is to 
pressure the defendant into accepting the prosecution’s plea deal. Many 
innocent persons plead guilty because it is the most rational choice given 
the odds, even if it means serving prison time.122 Often, the plea deal is so 
reduced, that the difference between risking trial and accepting a plea deal 
could be the risk of serving a few years in prison versus serving a few 
months. 
 
G. Applied to Swartz 
   
 Recall that Swartz hacked into JSTOR, from MIT’s computer system, 
and downloaded millions of articles from JSTOR’s secure servers.123 
Swartz’ prosecution followed the pattern outlined above.  Prosecutors filed 
duplicative charges124 carrying up to 50 years in prison.125 Then, 
 
117. Id. 
118. Id.; See also 1030(d)(12) (“the term ‘loss’ means any reasonable cost to any 
victim, including the cost of responding to an offense, conducting a damage 
assessment, and restoring the data, program, system, or information to its condition 
prior to the offense, and any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other consequential 
damages incurred because of interruption of service”). 
119. See Garnick, Losing Aaron Swartz: Part 2 (explaining how loss is calculated in a 
typical CFAA pleading). 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
122. See Garnick, Losing Aaron Swartz: Part 2 (implying many innocent persons plead 
guilty to not risk a significant amount of prison time). 
123. See Introduction. 
124. See Garnick, Losing Aaron Swartz: Part 2(stating she, and others, believe Swartz 
was overcharged); See also supra note 14 at 2. 
125. See Introduction. 
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prosecutors offered a plea deal. Supposedly, Swartz had three options: 1. 
plead guilty to 13 felonies and the Government would argue a six month 
prison term and Swartz’ lawyer could have argued for less; 2. plead guilty 
to all 13 felonies and the Government would have argued a 4 month 
sentence; or 3. risk trial, and the Government would argue for seven 
years.126   
 
H. Swartz Overcharged 
   
 Swartz was likely overcharged for two reasons.  First, the discrepancy 
between prison-time recommended by the Government if Swartz went to 
trial versus if he took a plea deal.  Second, the Government’s calculation of 
loss. 
 The plea deal was coercive. If Swartz took the deal, the Government 
would have argued for 4 or 6 months incarceration. If he went to trial, the 
Government would have argued for 7 years. Some say Swartz should have 
pled guilty.127 But the lenient offer ignores the unaccounted cost of being a 
convicted felon. Often, felons face social stigma, loss of job opportunities, 
and loss of voting rights, which they may never gain again.128 Furthermore, 
the judge is not restricted to the Government’s sentencing suggestion.  
Pleading guilty to a felony would have meant Swartz was facing at least 5 
years prison time according to the sentencing guidelines. Even if the 
Government argued four to six months, Swartz had no absolute guarantee 
he would only have served that much.129   
 Second, the Government’s calculation of loss could have ranged from 
a few thousand dollars to millions of dollars. The Government alleged that 
JSTOR’s information was “valued in the tens of thousands of dollars at the 
time.”130 Swartz downloaded around 4.8 million articles from JSTOR. The 
cost to download was $19.00. The Government could have argued Swartz 
caused anywhere from $10,000 to $91 million in damages to JSTOR.131 
 The practical result is that, the spectrum of loss calculations would 
have allowed the Government to argue for any sentence it wanted, and 
likely convince a jury by a preponderance of evidence.132 Furthermore, the 
Government ignored the fact that Swartz had settled out of court with 
JSTOR.   
 
126. See Garnick, Losing Aaron Swartz: Part 2 (commenting on alleged plea bargains 
Swartz was offered by the prosecution). 
127. See supra note 16, at 2. 
128. See Garnick, Losing Aaron Swartz: Part 2 (discussing extrajudicial reasons 
defendants have for not pleading to a much lesser sentence). 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
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 On June 3, 2011, Swartz and JSTOR entered into a civil agreement.133 
Pursuant to the agreement, Swartz certified that he made no copies of the 
downloaded files. He delivered the only existing disk of the files to 
JSTOR’s attorneys, who delivered the disk to the United States Attorney’s 
Office. Furthermore, Swartz paid $1,500 in damages and $25,000 in 
attorneys’ fees.134 Afterwards, JSTOR considered the matter closed, and 
publicly declared its preference that Swartz not be charged. On July 19, 
2011, Swartz’ federal indictment was unsealed135 and JSTOR was one of 
the parties subpoenaed.  In response, JSTOR issued the following public 
statement: “As noted previously, our interest was in securing the content.  
Once this was achieved, we had no interest in this becoming an ongoing 
legal matter …”136 Up until Swartz’ suicide, JSTOR’s attorneys contacted 
lead prosecutor Carmen Ortiz numerous times, reaffirming their wishes that 
charges against Swartz be dropped.137 
 Swartz was charged regardless of his intent, the operational reality of 
his actions, or the relationship between him and JSTOR - extrajudicial 
realities that should have mitigated the force of the Government’s 
prosecution. 
 
IV. PROPOSED LEGISLATION 
 
A. Reform 
 
 It is inequitable and unconscionable for a hacker like Swartz to be 
charged without taking into account the operational reality of his actions. 
He returned the copied materials and settled out of court. In return, JSTOR 
publicly campaigned for charges to be dismissed. JSTOR’s public actions 
suggest that there are societal conventions that the prosecutors should have 
taken notice of, but did not. 
 The CFAA is a bright line rule around a box. Once triggered, it does 
not take notice of the contents inside the box, or who is entitled to them.  In 
this case, JSTOR was the owner of the box, but liability was triggered, 
regardless of JSTOR’s wishes. Rather than a bright line rule governed by 
prosecutorial discretion, the CFAA should create a bright line exception to 
a general rule stating that in order for criminal liability to be established, an 
infraction must pass a certain threshold.138 If the infraction does not pass 
 
133. Report to the President MIT and the Prosecution of Aaron Swarz at 41-42, 
http://swartz-report.mit.edu/docs/report-to-the-president.pdf (last accessed 
December 19, 2013) (recounting Swartz’ plea with JSTOR in a comprehensive 
MIT investigative report about the incident). 
134. Id. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
138. See generally Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope at 1648-1649 (suggesting similar mindset 
to a proposed restructuring of the CFAA). 
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the threshold, then legal remedies should be limited to civil litigation.  
Congress should change the CFAA, either through amendment, or new 
legislation. A suggestion is the  “Hacker’s Rule” discussed below. 
 
B. The Hacker’s Rule 
   
 The Hacker’s Rule proposition is a two-part rule that abolishes the 
current bright line rule. Recall that the current rule establishes criminal 
prosecution whenever a person uses a computer without authorization, or 
exceeds authorization. The Hacker’s Rule would create an exception for 
when a person who uses a computer without authorization, or exceeds 
authorization is not criminally liable.139 A hacker would be criminally 
liable if he: 1) acts with malicious intent or 2) if no malicious intent or no 
federal interest, then his unauthorized intrusion was reckless enough that, 
regardless of any civil or extrajudicial settlement with the injured party, 
traditional criminal conventions would seek to punish. 
 
C. Malicious Intent 
 
 Professor Orin Kerr stated the charges against Swartz were “pretty 
much what any good federal prosecutor would have charged.”140 At the 
same time, Kerr recognized that Swartz’ case demonstrates that criminal 
prosecution under the CFAA is triggered too quickly. Kerr wrote that “[t]he 
law needs to draw a distinction between low-level crimes and more serious 
crimes, and current law does so poorly”141   
 Privacy and computer security activist Chris Soghoian, a senior policy 
analyst at the American Civil Liberties Union, suggests that existing law 
needs to differentiate between malicious, and non-malicious intrusions by 
hackers for the purpose of showing off their skill or spreading information 
they believe should be available publicly.142 
 
D. Reckless Use 
   
 The second part of the Hacker’s Rule creates a general rule, that if the 
 
139. The Hacker’s Rule is a proposition for criminal offenses and does not preclude 
civil liability triggered due to a breach of terms, an employment contract, or other 
infraction by which the user accessed the computer without authorization. 
140. See supra note 20, at 3. 
141. Orin Kerr, The Criminal Charges Against Aaron Swartz (Part 2: prosecutorial 
Discretion), THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 16, 2013 11:34 PM), 
http://www.volokh.com/2013/01/16/the-criminal-charges-against-aaron-swartz-
part-2-prosecutorial-discretion/. 
142. See Daniel Wagner and Verona Dobnik, Swartz’ Death Fuels Debate Over 
Computer Crime, THE BIG STORY (Jan 13, 2013), 
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/swartz-death-fuels-debate-over-computer-crime 
(discussing policy experts’ opinions). 
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hacker’s intent is not malicious, the prosecution must show it was, 
nevertheless, reckless enough that the person should be punished, even if, 
the person settled with the injured party. Furthermore, this part creates a 
bright line exception to the general rule of recklessness, that if the conduct 
is contrary to a federal interest, then the person is prosecuted. 
 Congress would have to define federal interest. A place to start is in § 
1030(d)(2) of the CFAA. That section lists instances, involving national 
security issues that the FBI may investigate.143 Congress could combine 
this with the original definition of federal interest.144 A possible new 
definition of federal interest could be: unauthorized access to national 
interest information, personal financial information, Government owned 
computers or a violation of §1030(d)(2). This would be the bright line 
exception that automatically triggers liability. The rest would be evaluated 
case by case.145 The Government would have the burden of showing that an 
outcome reached between two parties, such as the settlement between 
Swartz and JSTOR is inequitable. 
 
E. Application to Swartz 
   
 It is unlikely that Swartz would have been prosecuted under the 
proposed Hacker Rule. First, Swartz did not have malicious intent.146 
Second, the damage he caused was sufficiently cured by his extrajudicial 
agreement with JSTOR and was not reckless enough that traditional 
criminal sanctions should seek to punish.147 
 
F. Swartz’ Conduct 
 
 Applying the first prong, Swartz did not have any malicious intent. The 
 
143. See CFAA 1030(d)(2) (2008) (“The Federal Bureau of Investigation shall have 
primary authority to investigate offenses under subsection (a)(1) for any cases 
involving espionage, foreign counterintelligence, information protected against 
unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national defense or foreign relations”). 
144. Federal interest was originally defined as a computer that held national security, or 
financial information, or was property of the government.  See Section I(A) supra 
at 6. 
145. See Section I(A) supra at 5-6. 
146. See James Boyce, The Prosecution of Aaron Swartz: A Reply to Orin Kerr, THE 
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 18, 2013 10:00 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-boyle/prosecution-aaron-
swartz_b_2508242.html (implying that, given Swartz’ motivation for past projects, 
he was likely motivated by his desire to do what he considered a public good). 
147. See Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope, at 1656-7 (discussing traditional theories of 
punishment). 
Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet · Vol. 6 · 2015  
Computer Fraud and Abuse or Prosecutorial Fraud and Abuse: Time for Change 
88 
Government alleged he accessed JSTOR with intent to defraud148, but 
Swartz’ mental state suggested otherwise.149 Even if the Government 
argued that, Swartz’ download could have deprived JSTOR of a 
competitive advantage in attracting customers to sign up, Swartz’ intent 
was not to enter the online journal database market with articles 
downloaded from JSTOR.150   
 
G. Damage is Curable by Extrajudicial Agreement with JSTOR 
 
 As mentioned above, Swartz and JSTOR reached a civil settlement. As 
part of the settlement, Swartz paid monetary damages and gave a disk of 
the files he downloaded to JSTOR’s attorneys. The attorneys then handed 
the disk to the Department of Justice. This is an equitable solution.  
JSTOR’S primary concern was the whereabouts of the data. Also, they 
were compensated for their troubles. There was no future threat because 
Swartz returned the files and declared he had not kept a copy for himself.  
In return, JSTOR had shown good faith and publicly supported him.   
 Traditionally, criminal liability is limited in scope to conduct that 
satisfies utilitarian and retributive goals.151 Utilitarianism seeks to punish a 
defendant in a way that is also beneficial to society, and goals include 
deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation.152 The retributive goal is to 
align the scope of criminal activity with societal values of justice.153 For 
computer crime, the most important is deterrence.154 Criminal prosecution 
should benefit society by discouraging future harmful conduct.155 JSTOR’s 
 
148. See Grand Jury Indictment, U.S. v. Aaron Swartz, 1:11-cr-10260-NMG at 10, (D. 
Mass., filed Sep. 12, 2012), available at 
http://tech.mit.edu/V132/N40/aaronsw/superseding-indictment.pdf (alleging 
Swartz sought to defraud by concealing his identity on the network). 
149. See Lawrence Lessig, Prosecution as a Bully, (Jan. 13, 2013). 
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2013-01-17/the-overzealous-prosecution-
of-aaron-swartz (offering possible mental state of Swartz by rebuking the notion 
that academic journals are a profitable endeavor with strong language, and, 
pointing out that many of Swartz’ projects, such as Reddit and Creative Commons, 
were done with the mindset of building a free service for users). 
150. See generally Section I(A) discussing Seidlitz at 4.  There, the defendant intended 
to use copied material in his own business; See generally Section II.  Citrin, 
Brekka, and Nosal all involved defendants who intended to use information in a 
competing business.  There, an allegation of the plaintiffs was intention to defraud 
by exceeding authorized access.  Here, the facts are distinguished because Swartz 
did not intend to enter a for-profit business with the articles he downloaded. 
151. See Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope, at 1656-1657 (applying traditional theories of 
criminal punishment to computer crimes). 
152. Id at 1656. 
153. Id at 1657. 
154. Id at 1656. 
155. Id. 
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public support of Swartz is an indication that there might not be a societal 
benefit from prosecuting him. 
 The Government did not have a clear federal interest. Swartz did not 
hack into a financial institution, or a Government computer, or compromise 
national security. The articles Swartz downloaded were academic, and 
available to anyone who wished to sign up for JSTOR’s services.156 The 
Government would have been unlikely to show Swartz was so reckless as 
to be charged criminally in order to deter future behavior or correct a 
wrong, as the Hacker’s Rule would require.  
 The Government would have had the burden to show that Swartz’ 
actions were reckless enough that there is a societal interest in prosecuting 
him. What is reckless requires a case-by-case analysis.157 For example, a 
person who hacks into a school’s security camera system as a prank may 
reach a settlement with the school (or, be expelled), but the act 
compromised the school’s safety during the time the system was off, 
whether or not intended. Society has an interest to deter future conduct 
because other persons were put at risk. The action is reckless and incurable 
by a settlement. 
 Swartz’ action may have been inconsiderate of other JSTOR users 
whose ability to use JSTOR was hampered, but this is a matter of 
inconvenience limited to only JSTOR users, and did not pose a danger to 
anyone. If JSTOR subscribers had been severely affected by Swartz’ 
actions, they could have filed a civil suit. Columbia Law professor Tim Wu 
summarized Swartz’ case best, writing: " … was no actual physical harm, 
nor actual economic harm. The leak was found and plugged; JSTOR 
suffered no actual economic loss. It did not press charges. Like a pie in the 
face, Swartz’s act was annoying to its victim, but of no lasting 
consequence."158 
 
H.  Other Tests 
 
 As mentioned above, Brekka would be one solution to narrowing the 
CFAA’s scope. As Nosal demonstrated, Brekka can limit the scope of a 
criminal prosecution, but Brekka does not create an exempt class of users.  
Under Brekka, a user like Swartz would be liable for criminal prosecution 
because he accessed JSTOR without authorization.159 Brekka is narrowing 
of the CFAA through clarification but is still a bright line rule.  
156. See Lessig, Prosecution as a Bully; See generally http://about.jstor.org/ (last 
accessed March 17, 2014). 
157. See supra discussion in Part I at 5. 
158. Tim Wu, How the Legal System Failed Aaron Swartz – And us, THE NEW YORKER 
(Jan. 14, 2013), 
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2013/01/everyone-interesting-
is-a-felon.html. 
159. See generally Garnick, Losing Aaron Swartz (hypothesizing that under Brekka, 
Swartz exceeded authorization because MIT had blacklisted his laptop and in 
response Swartz concealed his identity). 
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 Professor Kerr has postulated a rule based on code-circumvention.  
Kerr defines access “without authorization” to mean circumventing code-
restrictions. The practical effect would be to reduce the scope of 
unauthorized access statutes.160 A person would be criminally liable only if 
they circumvent a computer code to gain access to information.  If they just 
violate the terms of service, or a private contract, no criminal liability is 
triggered. Kerr’s proposal would filter out innocuous use and disagreement 
among parties from criminal liability.   
 Kerr gives an example of, a pro-life owner of a computer network 
inserting a clause in the terms of agreement that only pro-life opinions may 
be expressed on the network.161 He concludes that, a pro-choice opinion 
would violate the terms of use, “making the access ‘without authorization’ 
or ‘exceeding authorized access’ and triggering criminal liability.”162 This 
is exactly the type of deficiency in criminal liability that the Hacker’s Rule 
would correct. Expressing those views might result in a person’s access 
from the network being rescinded,163 but the infraction would fall short of 
recognizable malice, a federal interest, or be considered reckless to trigger 
criminal liability.   
 It is unlikely Kerr’s proposal would have prevented Swartz’ 
prosecution.164 The indictment stated MIT had blocked Swartz’ laptop’s 
MAC address.165 Swartz spoofed his MAC address to gain re-entry into the 
network. The effect was to trick the network into thinking a different 
computer was accessing it. Although not a literal code circumvention, 
Swartz’ action was in response to MIT’s restriction on his use, based on his 
computer’s unique code.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The CFAA should be reformed for two reasons. First, innocuous acts 
are criminalized.  Second, in contradiction to the general framework of law, 
the CFAA does not exempt any class of user or type of use. 
Consequentially, the CFAA is prone to prosecutorial abuse, because there 
are no specific guidelines, only a bright line rule. 
 The author of this Note is sympathetic towards Aaron Swartz. His 
 
160. See Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope at 1649. 
161. See Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope at 1658. 
162. See Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope at 1659. 
163. For example, if it is a web forum, the person’s IP address may be blocked. 
164. See Garnick, Losing Aaron Swartz (skeptical that Swartz would have escaped 
prosecution under Kerr’s rule because Swartz repeatedly spoofed his MAC address 
on MIT’s network). 
165. A Mac address is a computer’s unique physical address.  When a computer is 
connected to the Internet, the IP address is related to the MAC address on the local 
area network.  See http://searchnetworking.techtarget.com/definition/MAC-
address. 
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suicide prevented a legal conclusion to his prosecution, but it should not 
detract from the deficiencies in the CFAA, and the socially unjust 
consequences that hold true regardless of Swartz’ choice. The legal 
relevance is the charges he was facing, and the law behind them, not his 
reaction to them. Had Swartz lived, the purpose of this Note would have 
remained the same. The conclusions made are not intended to be an 
absolute solution, and not everyone will agree with the views presented.  
But, as the literature on the subject has shown, legal scholars agree that the 
CFAA is in need of reform. Ultimately, this Note seeks to raise awareness 
about this issue, and encourage further thinking and action. 
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